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Abstract
Background: Euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) have been legally possible in the Netherlands since 2001,
provided that statutory due care criteria are met, including: (a) voluntary and well-considered request; (b)
unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement; (c) informing the patient; (d) lack of a reasonable
alternative; (e) independent second physician’s opinion. ‘Unbearable suffering’ must have a medical basis,
either somatic or psychiatric, but there is no requirement of limited life expectancy. All EAS cases must be
reported and are scrutinised by regional review committees (RTE). The purpose of this study was to investigate
whether any particular difficulties arise when the EAS due care criteria are applied to patients with an intellectual
disability and/or autism spectrum disorder.
Methods: The 416 case summaries available on the RTE website (2012–2016) were searched for intellectual disability
(6) and autism spectrum disorder (3). Direct content analysis was used on these nine cases.
Results: Assessment of decisional capacity was mentioned in eight cases, but few details given; in two cases, there had
been uncertainty or disagreement about capacity. Two patients had progressive somatic conditions. For most, suffering
was due to an inability to cope with changing circumstances or increasing dependency; in several cases, suffering was
described in terms of characteristics of living with an autism spectrum disorder, rather than an acquired medical
condition. Some physicians struggled to understand the patient’s perspective. Treatment refusal was a common
theme, leading physicians to conclude that EAS was the only remaining option. There was a lack of detail on social
circumstances and how patients were informed about their prognosis.
Conclusions: Autonomy and decisional capacity are highly complex for patients with intellectual disabilities and difficult
to assess; capacity tests in these cases did not appear sufficiently stringent. Assessment of suffering is particularly difficult
for patients who have experienced life-long disability. The sometimes brief time frames and limited number of physician-
patient meetings may not be sufficient to make a decision as serious as EAS. The Dutch EAS due care criteria are
not easily applied to people with intellectual disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorder, and do not appear to
act as adequate safeguards.
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Background
Views on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
(EAS) differ widely and are often strongly held. At the
heart of the debate is a tension in the weight afforded
to key principles of medical ethics: respect for patient
autonomy, beneficience, nonmaleficence, justice and
scope. These latter two also recognise the role of law
in protecting citizens from harm. Patient autonomy
underpins patient-centered care, and proponents of
EAS cite self-determination as an overriding principle,
while opponents highlight the relational nature of hu-
man autonomy and point out that self-determination
is not without its limits [1]. All agree that a physician’s
duty is to relieve suffering. Proponents argue that
death relieves suffering, while opponents emphasise
that EAS is incompatible with a physician’s duties of
beneficence and nonmaleficence.
Interpretation of these ethical principles is reflected
in the development of EAS legislation, as well as in
arguments opposing such legislation to license doctors
to provide lethal drugs under certain specified condi-
tions. The European Association for Palliative Care
(EAPC) concluded that it is not possible to achieve
consensus on the issue, due to incompatible and clash-
ing normative frameworks [2]. Proponents of EAS in
countries without such laws argue that EAS legislation
serves to relieve intolerable suffering and promote
personal control over dying; that the criteria for EAS
laid down by law provide transparency; and that the
legal frameworks act as safeguards against illegal prac-
tices. Opponents point to difficulties in ensuring that
the broadly-worded criteria for legalised EAS are met,
to the ongoing higher levels of illegal practices, to the
incremental increase of such practices, both legal and
illegal [3], and to concerns about how such legislation
might affect the safeguarding and rights of vulnerable
patient groups [4, 5].
This paper aims to examine and reflect on the way in
which legal criteria are applied to patients with intel-
lectual disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorder
who request EAS in the Netherlands, the first coun-
try in the world to introduce EAS legislation. The
authors of this paper are experts in the fields of in-
tellectual disability and end-of-life care. They come
from the UK and the Netherlands, two countries
where ethical principles are translated into divergent
legal frameworks with regards to EAS. The aim of
this paper is not to present a common ethical view
or to promote a particular side of the EAS argu-
ment, but to contribute to the EAS debate by dis-
cussing the implications, including the risks, for two
particularly vulnerable patient groups, based on fac-
tual reports from a country where EAS is a legal
possibility.
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS) in the
Netherlands
In 2001 the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted
Suicide Act (“the 2001 Act”) was passed in the Netherlands,
making it legally possible for physicians to terminate
the life, or assist the suicide, of a patient provided that
six ‘due care’ criteria have been met. These due care
criteria include the requirement that the EAS request is
voluntary and well-considered and that the patient experi-
ences unbearable suffering without prospect of relief. All
decisions by doctors to administer euthanasia or assist a
patient’s suicide must be reported to a regional review com-
mittee (Regionale Toetsingscommissie Euthanasie (RTE))
legally tasked with scrutinising after the event whether the
decisions that were made met the due care criteria.
The 2001 Act requires the RTE to issue annual reports
describing their findings. These annual reports are avail-
able on the RTE website (including English, French and
German translations from 2010), along with further se-
lected case summaries (in Dutch only) (www.euthanasie
commissie.nl / https://english.euthanasiecommissie.nl). In
2015, the RTE published a Code of Practice which out-
lines the issues that the committees regard as relevant in
performing their statutory task; this too is available on
the RTE website, including an English translation. The
Code of Practice gives guidance to physicians on asses-
sing whether a patient meets the criteria for EAS. It
acknowledges, for example, that ‘unbearable suffering’ is
a subjective notion: what is bearable for one patient may
be unbearable for another. It stipulates that the suffering
must be ‘palpable’ to the physician and states that “the
physician must therefore not only be able to empathise
with the patient’s situation, but also see it from the patient’s
point of view” [6] (p.14). The case summaries and annual
reports are written in lay language. They are explicitly
meant to give an impression of how the committees
apply and interpret the due care criteria for euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide as set out in the Act, and
as such, they serve as ‘case law’. Additional file 1 gives
an overview of the practice of EAS in the Netherlands,
the due care criteria, and of the RTE.
It is important to note the factors that are not men-
tioned in the 2001 Act. There are no specified causes of
suffering for which EAS is permitted, and the Act says
nothing about the patient’s life expectancy. In practice,
life expectancy will often be limited, but the Act does
not rule out granting an EAS request from a patient
who may have many years to live [6]. In 2002 the Dutch
Supreme Court passed a verdict in the Brongersma case
(the physician-assisted suicide of an elderly gentleman
who suffered immobility and loneliness, and was ‘tired
of life’) that the unbearable nature of the patient’s suffer-
ing, and the lack of prospect of improvement, must have
a medical dimension [7]. From previous verdicts by the
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RTE, it is clear that the medical condition can be either
somatic or psychiatric, and that an accumulation of con-
ditions of old age can also be the cause of unbearable
suffering without prospect of improvement. The law also
makes it legally possible for patients who are no longer
capable of expressing their will (including those with ad-
vanced dementia) to have EAS, as an advance euthanasia
directive can replace a verbal EAS request. There have
been proposals to extend the option of EAS to people
who do not suffer on medical grounds but simply feel
they have ‘completed life’; in 2016, these proposals were
investigated and rejected by parliament [8], but the soci-
etal debate and campaign continues. The total number
of EAS notifications in 2016 was 6091, which accounts
for 4% of all deaths in the Netherlands; of these, over
96% were euthanasia and 3.5% were physician-assisted
suicide [9].
EAS for mental suffering
The number of Dutch cases of EAS for psychiatric prob-
lems remains relatively small, but is rising steadily. There
were 2 reported cases in 2010, 42 in 2013, and 60 in
2016. EAS for mental suffering has been fiercely de-
bated. Arguments have focused on the difficulty of asses-
sing the patient’s subjective perception and complaints
and on the challenges in assessing the patient’s capacity
of judgement, which may be impaired by psychiatric
conditions such as severe depression [10–12]. Arguments
in favour of including both mental and physical suffering
as legally acceptable grounds for EAS focus on the fact
that a key objective of such legislation is to relieve suffer-
ing. On what reasoning can it be offered to people with
certain conditions (medical or otherwise) which cause suf-
fering but not to others, given that psychological suffering
may be as unbearable as physiological pain? It is worth
noting that the reasons often given for EAS requests, even
in cases of somatic conditions, are not so much a fear of
pain: it is the functional limitations and dependence on
others that many people find intolerable to such an extent
that they would prefer to die [13].
EAS, intellectual disability and autism spectrum disorder
People fall within the definition of having an intellectual
disability if they have a significantly reduced ability to
understand new or complex information and to learn
and apply new skills (impaired intelligence), resulting in
a significantly reduced ability to cope independently (im-
paired adaptive and/or social functioning), which begins
before adulthood, with a lasting effect on development
[14]. Autism spectrum disorder is a complex and usually
lifelong developmental disorder that can cause problems
with thinking, feeling and language, characterised by per-
sistent difficulties with social communication and social
interaction [15]. Although autism spectrum disorders are
common among people with intellectual disabilities, not all
people with autistic spectrum disorder have an intellectual
disability. Asperger’s syndrome, for example, is a type of
autism that is characterised by average or above-average
intelligence.
We have found no papers to date that are focused on
the implications of EAS legislation for people with an
intellectual disability or autism spectrum disorder, but
there have been discussions of the consequences for vul-
nerable patient groups. Frost et al. [4] assert that it is
impossible for doctors to advise patients regarding the
point at which their situation becomes less preferable to
being dead. They argue that legalising assisted dying by
attempting to establish an absolute right to bodily auton-
omy may undermine other individual and group rights,
and that by creating one class of people for whom life is
expendable, that particular view may be extended by
society to all groups possessing such attributes (such as
permanently disabled people). They fear that there
would be a risk to the rights of such vulnerable groups
in the form of society being less willing to provide for
their care and support.
Krahn [5] reports on a debate by the Disability Section
of the American Public Health Association on the mean-
ing of policy on physician-assisted dying for people with
disabilities, and concludes that this group bears a dispro-
portionate share of the burden:
“Because aid in dying is used primarily to address loss
of autonomy and not pain management, and because
proponents argue that severe disability should warrant
the right to end their life, this suggests a devaluing of
a life lived with significant functional limitations…If
society endorses the right of a person to seek
physician assistance to end his or her life because of
increasing loss of functional autonomy, what does
that say about how our society values the lives of
people who live with comparable limitations every day
of their lives for years on end?” [5] (p.54)
This relates to the question whether the EAS criteria
of ‘unbearable suffering’ can be applied to situations where
suffering is caused by either lifelong or acquired disability,
which is usually seen as a socially determined condition,
not a medical one. A human rights argument is used by
disability rights activists who fear that EAS stigmatises life
with a disability and potentially discriminates against them.
However, proponents of the right to die also cite a human
rights argument [16]; this includes some disabled people
who desire more control in the timing of their death [17].
The question whether people with intellectual disabilities
and/or autism spectrum disorder need particular attention
with regards to EAS is an important one – whether in rela-
tion to debates around putting in place EAS legislation, or
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in relation to EAS requests from vulnerable persons in ju-
risdictions that have such legislation in place. The principle
that people with disabilities must not be treated differently
on the basis of their disability is enshrined in the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [18],
firmly rejecting an approach where disability automatically
disqualifies a person from making decisions. However,
because of the serious and irrevocable nature of EAS, it
could be argued that vulnerable people need special protec-
tion. There is thus a moral tension between people’s right
to autonomy on the one hand and the need to prevent
harm on the other.
The Dutch due care criteria are intended to protect
people from harm, whilst upholding their right to auton-
omy. This paper looks at how effective the due care cri-
teria are in relation to people with intellectual disabilities
and/or autism spectrum disorder. The Dutch RTE Code
of Practice states:
“Notifications of cases of euthanasia involving patients
with an intellectual disability are rare. There are cases
where patients with a mild intellectual disability are
capable of making a voluntary and well-considered
request for euthanasia, and where all the other due
care criteria are met. In these cases, particular attention
must be paid to the patient’s decisional competence
with regard to a request for euthanasia.” [6] (p.28)
The 2016 annual report includes a brief case summary
of a man with an intellectual disability caused by tuber-
ous sclerosis (case 2016–03), aimed at demonstrating
that it is indeed possible to administer euthanasia to
someone with an intellectual disability. Key to this was a
capacity assessment by a physician who had specialised
in the care of people with intellectual disabilities [9].
Assessing whether someone has the capacity needed to
make decisions, which is crucial for the assessment of
the due care criterion (a) ‘voluntary and well-considered
request’, could be especially difficult if the patient has an
intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder.
However, several of the other due care criteria could also
present particular challenges for these patients, including
criteria (b) assessment of a patient’s suffering, (c) the
provision of adequate information, (d) deciding together
with the patient that there is no reasonable alternative,
and (e) obtaining a second opinion from a physician
who does not have a current or recent treatment rela-
tionship with the patient [6].
The questions we asked were: How do physicians and
the Dutch regional euthanasia review committees oper-
ationalise the EAS due care criteria for patients who have
an intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder?
What, if any, are the particular difficulties when the EAS
due care criteria are applied to these patient groups?
Methods
During the 5 years between 2012 and 2016, the Dutch
RTEs received a total of 25,930 notifications of EAS; case
summaries of 416 of these are included (in Dutch) in a
searchable database on the RTE website (www.euthanasie
commissie.nl). There are no case summaries available
from before 2012. The first and second authors (ITW and
LC) are native Dutch speakers and fluent English speakers.
ITW searched the RTE website for cases of EAS involving
patients who had an intellectual disability and/or autism
spectrum disorder, by using a range of relevant keywords
(“verstandelijke/intellectuele beperking”, “zwakbegaafd”,
“lage/verminderde intelligentie”, “autisme”). This resulted
in 11 case summaries. One was excluded because the text
said the patient had been assessed for autism but was found
not to have it; and one was excluded as it concerned a
patient with dementia rather than an intellectual dis-
ability. The keyword ‘cognitive disturbances’ (‘cognitieve
stoornissen’) led to 38 additional results, all of which
were read and excluded, as they concerned patients with
psychiatric conditions or dementia but not intellectual dis-
abilities. The nine remaining case summaries were trans-
lated into English by ITW and read by all authors. They
were analysed using directed content analysis [19] with
pre-determined coding categories related to due care cri-
teria (a) to (e) (see Additional file 1). The final due care
criterion (f) relates to the drugs used to carry out the
euthanasia and was reported using near-identical wording
in each of the case summaries; this was excluded from our
analysis. Because the number of cases was relatively small,
no supportive software was used for the data analysis.
Results
The patients
Table 1 presents a summary and selected quotes with
regards to the patients’ stated characteristics, diagnosis,
and due care criteria (a) to (e). There were six women
and three men, with ages ranging from patients in their
30s to a patient in her 90s.
Intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder
Six patients had an intellectual disability, although none
of the case summaries describe the nature or extent of
the intellectual disability, nor how it affected the pa-
tient’s life. One woman (case 2014–83) was placed under
guardianship and had a mentor who was present at the
consultations with the physicians and who helped her
register with the End of Life Clinic when her own phys-
ician declined to meet her euthanasia request. For one
woman (case 2013–22), the intellectual disability and as-
sociated perceived lack of decision making capacity was
noted by a psychiatrist; however, when the RTE asked
the attending physician (who had carried out the eu-
thanasia) for clarification, he said that the patient’s low
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IQ score was probably due to a lack of schooling. Two
men had Asperger’s syndrome. One woman (case 2016–
48) had an autism spectrum disorder; slowness of thought
and mild cognitive disorder were also mentioned, but it is
not clear whether this was due to old age, physical decline
or intellectual disability.
Social circumstances
There was a fleeting reference to the patient’s family in
three case summaries (Case 2014–83: “Because of her
personality, she was in constant conflict with those
around her. This drove her family apart.” Case 2015–24:
“The patient’s family responded positively to this possibility
of admission [to a psychiatric unit].” Case 2016–48: The
consultant “didn’t manage to have a proper conversation
with the patient, and therefore he found it difficult to judge
whether the due care criteria had been met… The consult-
ant suggested visiting the patient again in the presence of
her immediate family.” It was not reported whether this
happened.)
None of the other case summaries contained any indi-
cation of the existence of family, friends or partners. A
mentor was mentioned in three cases. One patient lived
in a psychogeriatric unit and one lived alone; the other
case summaries lacked information about the living situ-
ation, so it was unclear whether a patient lived alone, with
family or others, or in a care setting. Previous admission to
a psychiatric in-patient setting was mentioned in six cases.
Information on other social circumstances was similarly
sparse, although there were several references to a patient’s
loneliness and social isolation.
Applying the due care criteria
(a)Voluntary and well-considered request
The EAS request, usually to a patient’s own GP, was ini-
tially refused in six cases. Three GPs “didn’t do” EAS. In
the other cases, the physician thought that the case was
too complex or the due care criteria had not been met.
These patients, whose request had been refused, then
went to another physician or to the End of Life Clinic.
There was an emphasis in the Dutch case summaries
on assessing the consistency of the patient’s choice, with
statements such as “she clearly realised what she was asking
for” (case 2016–73). Capacity assessments were mentioned
in eight case summaries, although five of those contained
no detail beyond the fact that the patient was found to have
decision-making capacity. In three cases, physicians dis-
agreed or wanted a second opinion about the patient’s
decision-making capacity. The use of the Appelbaum cri-
teria [20] (see Additional file 2) was mentioned in two cases.
In one of these (case 2013–22), the physician concluded that
the patient did not meet one of the Appelbaum criteria
(the ability to process information rationally), but that
she had “overall capacity”. One consultant, who felt unable
to assess capacity and found that the due care criteria had
not been met (case 2016–48), later accepted the positive
capacity assessment of an independent psychiatrist; no
further explanations were given of how this conclusion
was reached.
(b)Unbearable suffering without prospect of
improvement
The case summaries all described the patients’ ‘un-
bearable suffering’ in order to explain the EAS request.
Two patients (cases 2013–51 and 2016–03) had progres-
sive somatic conditions; the nature of their suffering was
described in terms of their physical decline and increas-
ing dependence.
Five had extensive, complex and longstanding psychi-
atric problems, including personality disorders, schizo-
phrenia and trauma resulting from childhood abuse. Four
of these had developed additional somatic conditions, redu-
cing their ability to cope. Difficulty in accepting or coping
with changes in circumstances was explicitly ascribed
to the presence of an intellectual disability or autism
spectrum disorder and judged to be a valid cause of un-
bearable suffering.
The physicians of a woman in her 90s, suffering from
age-related conditions (case 2016–48), found it “difficult
to judge whether the patient suffered unbearably” and
found that “the patient’s suffering was understandable
only to a limited degree”. Assessment by an independent
psychiatrist was requested; the explanations of this psych-
iatrist “convinced the patient’s physician that people with
an autism spectrum disorder suffer in a way that may not
be directly understandable to others”. It was accepted that
the patient’s suffering was unbearable “by looking at suffer-
ing from the perspective of someone with autism. The loss
of control… can cause unbearable suffering for an autistic
person.”
For two patients, for whom various psychiatric and
somatic conditions were described, the stated suffering
appeared to stem from characteristics of autism spectrum
disorder itself, rather than from acquired medical condi-
tions. One man (case 2013–21) was said to be unable to
adapt to new situations and found it very difficult to have
an overview of how to manage his daily life. For another, a
man in his 30s (case 2014–77), who had an extensive psy-
chiatric history, the suffering was vividly and strikingly
described as being unable to maintain social contacts or
have meaningful relationships. The case summary stated
that his suffering was “caused by an autism spectrum dis-
order” and continued that “cure was no longer possible.
The treatment was only palliative.” The statement that
“cure was no longer possible” seemed to be standard, as it
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appeared in all nine case summaries; the palliative nature
of treatment was mentioned in seven cases.
(c) Informing the patient about his prospects
Each of the case reports included the identical state-
ment that “the physician had informed the patient suffi-
ciently about his/her situation and his/her prospects”.
However, there was no information about how the pa-
tients were helped to understand their situation, or
whether any adjustments needed to be made to support
understanding. One patient (case 2015–24) was said to
have been “sufficiently informed at her own level”. There
is an indication in one case (2013–22) that the physician
tried and failed to help the patient understand the na-
ture of her symptoms (flashing lights due to eye disease).
(d)Lack of a reasonable alternative
Treatment alternatives were mostly described as hav-
ing been tried and found to be ineffective. All case re-
ports stated that “there were no possibilities to relieve
the suffering that were acceptable to the patient”. The
key to this statement appeared to be “acceptable to the
patient”. In several cases, the physicians thought there
might be alternatives to EAS. Complying with another
treatment was a condition for entering the EAS trajec-
tory in two cases; both failed to improve the patient’s
condition. In one case (2016–73) the psychiatrist who
assessed the patient in relation to the EAS request felt
that EAS was inappropriate as alternative treatments
could be tried, but the patient refused. Another psych-
iatrist was then found who agreed that there were no
treatment options left. Patient refusal or non-compliance
was a common reason for physicians running out of
options, leading them to agree that the situation had
become hopeless. This includes a woman who suffered
from tinnitus (case 2015–24); her EAS request stemmed
from a refusal to cooperate with treatments that might
enable her to live with the condition. Her sole focus on
euthanasia rather than possible treatments was explained
by her physicians as being due to her “primitive thinking
abilities”. Her physician “saw her suffering” and thought
that, because none of the other choices being offered to
relieve the suffering were acceptable to her, “euthanasia
was the only way out for the patient”.
(e)Consulting at least one other independent physician
An independent physician, often a psychiatrist, assessed
whether due care criteria (a) to (d) had been fulfilled. In
all cases, this was a SCEN (Support and Consultation on
Euthanasia in the Netherlands) physician who had been
specially trained to provide such consultation and give a
written opinion. These consultants did not know the pa-
tient; he or she read the case notes and typically visited
the patient once, between 5 weeks and 3 days before the
euthanasia was carried out. A typical statement was “The
psychiatrist spoke with the patient… he concluded, partly
based on the conversation with the patient, that the due
care criteria had been met” (case 2014–77). In one case
(2016–48) the consultant visited the patient three times
over six months, as he was not sure whether the due care
criteria had been met. Two SCEN physicians were con-
sulted in case 2015–24 and three in case 2014–83, also
because of uncertainty about the due care criteria.
The RTEs accepted the physicians’ assessments of pa-
tient suffering, prospects and capacity in all cases. Where
there had been doubts or disagreements, they asked the
physicians with the positive assessments of due care cri-
teria (a) or (b) for further explanations, but not those with
negative assessments.
Discussion
In a society where EAS is legalised and a clearly viable
option in the eyes of a large proportion of the population,
as is the case in the Netherlands (where currently around
1 in 25 deaths are through EAS [9]), there should be clear
and compelling reasons if a person with an intellectual
disability or autism spectrum disorder is to be denied this
option.
Our findings are in line with those of Kim et al. [21]
who reviewed 66 Dutch case summaries of patients re-
ceiving EAS for psychiatric conditions. In a discussion of
capacity evaluations in these 66 cases, two of the cases
we examined (2013–22 and 2014–83) are described in
detail [12]. They conclude that
“the practice of EAS for psychiatric disorders involves
complicated, suffering patients whose requests for
EAS often require considerable physician judgement.
The retrospective oversight system in the Netherlands
generally defers to the judgements of the physicians
who perform the EAS.” [21] (p.367)
Dutch physicians thus carry significant responsibility
in deciding whether or not a patient’s EAS request can
be met. Here we discuss the difficulties they face in
applying the due care criteria to the situations of vul-
nerable patients.
(a)Voluntary and well-considered EAS request
The RTE Code of Practice 2015 states that “decisional
competence means that the patient is able to understand
relevant information about his situation and prognosis,
consider any alternatives and assess the implications of
his decision” [6] (p12). The RTE highlights the importance
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of careful capacity assessments if the patient has an intel-
lectual disability [6]. The case summaries have shown how
difficult such assessments can be, and it is therefore
particularly unhelpful that so little detail is given about
how the conclusion was reached that these patients had
capacity.
Under Dutch legislation [22], as in many other jurisdic-
tions including the UK [23], capacity is decision-specific.
There is a presumption that capacity should be deemed to
exist unless there is evidence to the contrary; in other
words, the test for capacity involves disproving someone’s
competence for a particular decision. Dutch government
guidance states that capacity assessments should be
based primarily on a patient’s ability to comprehend the
decision, rather than on the outcome of the patient’s
decision, as focusing on the latter risks the assessor’s
norms and values being decisive. However, it goes on to
explain that:
“This does not mean that the assessor must put aside
his own norms and values completely. In dialogue
between the assessor and the patient, their respective
norms and values can influence each other; but in
assessing decisional capacity, the assessor’s norms and
values must not be unilaterally decisive. However, the
nature of a patient’s intended decision can be a
reason for assessing his decisional capacity.” [22]
(p.7, translated by ITW)
This guidance seems to recognise the perhaps difficult-
to-avoid fact that a physician’s ideas about what is best for
the patient may influence the patient’s choices.
The most commonly used and influential model for
assessing whether a patient has the capacity to exercise
autonomy in making healthcare choices is the MacArthur
model, which consists of four abilities (also known as
the “Appelbaum criteria”): to understand the illness
and treatment-related information; to appreciate the
significance of that information; to weigh up options
using reasoning and logic; and to communicate a choice
[20] (see Additional file 2). The Appelbaum criteria
were referred to by Dutch physicians and the RTE as
their model for capacity assessments. The use of this
model for EAS decisions is not without its difficulties.
Whilst impairment of decision-making capacity lies on
a continuum, the judgment of decision-making capacity
is an all-or-nothing concept (either the patient has cap-
acity to take a particular decision, or he doesn’t). Where
on the continuum the cut-off point for competence lies, is
therefore a matter of physician judgement. Appelbaum
[24] has argued that the stringency of capacity tests should
vary directly with the seriousness of the likely conse-
quences of the patient’s decisions. In the reported case
summaries, it appears that the bar is not set high. In one
case, the physician stated explicitly that a patient did not
have all four Appelbaum abilities, but she was still deemed
to be competent. This “lower threshold view” was also
noted by Doernsberg et al. [12] in their review of cap-
acity evaluations of psychiatric patients requesting EAS
in the Netherlands. However, for decisions involving
EAS, applying capacity laws and guidance is challenging.
Legislation and guidance governing capacity assessments
have not been written specifically for assessment of EAS
requests; indeed, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England
and Wales) [25] specifically states at Section 62 that noth-
ing in the Act affects the law relating to assisting suicide.
Wide variations and inconsistencies have been reported in
the way mental capacity in patients requesting hastened
death is conceptualised, but many consider that EAS
should only be open to those with a high degree of mental
capacity to make such a request [11]. In other words, for a
life-or-death decision such as EAS, the bar should be set
high, with patients meeting all aspects of stringent cap-
acity assessments. Whether the MacArthur model is in
fact appropriate for such assessment is open to debate
and requires a comparative prospective research study.
The model has been criticised for its focus on cognition,
understanding and reasoning, ignoring the importance of
emotions, values, biographical and context-specific factors
[26–29]. A study by Tan et al. [28] showed that compe-
tence to refuse treatment may be compromised in patients
with anorexia nervosa because of their difficulties with
thought processing and changes in values, which was not
captured by the standardised tests for competence. Breden
and Vollmann [26] argue that in reality, patients often
base a preferred choice on emotions, values or intuitive
factors rather than on a rational analysis of all the options.
This debate is important and may well lead to future
changes in the way decision-making capacity is concep-
tualised and assessed, but at present, the MacArthur
model is reflected in legal frameworks as well as guid-
ance to Dutch physicians. Because of the complexities
of capacity assessments and the judgement required of
physicians, even within the seemingly clear Appelbaum
criteria, it is especially important that the specifics of
such assessments are described with greater transpar-
ency than we have found within the case summaries.
Stringent capacity testing and a high bar for decision-
making capacity, under the current model, would mean
that the patient has all four Appelbaum abilities. We
could not find evidence of such stringent testing in the
Dutch case summaries. Most contained no detail of
how the Appelbaum criteria were operationalised.
The RTE reports put a heavy emphasis on the consistent
or repeated nature of an EAS request, but for people with
an intellectual disability, the difficulties with decision-
making are more commonly in the area of ‘appreciating
the significance of the information’ or ‘reasoning with the
Tuffrey-Wijne et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2018) 19:17 Page 15 of 21
information and weighing up treatment options’ (see
Additional file 2). An example of how a consistent treat-
ment refusal can be wrongly seen as a competent and
autonomous decision is given in a UK study of patient
safety issues, where a senior hospital consultant initially
thought a patient with intellectual disabilities was being
clear and consistent in his treatment refusal:
“[The patient] had cancer and needed surgery. I didn’t
realise that he didn’t have the capacity to say ‘no’ to
the operation. He didn’t want the operation, and I just
thought that was that.” [30] (p.98)
It wasn’t until this patient was seen by the hospital’s
intellectual disability nurse specialist, who found that the
patient did not fully appreciate the consequences of his
decision, that he was found to lack capacity; the patient,
who would have died without surgery, had the operation
after all, following a ‘best interest’ decision.
A persistent request does not necessarily imply cap-
acity; it might even be indicative of a lack of capacity, if
the patient’s intellectual disability leads to difficulties in
considering or weighing up alternatives. In case 2015–24
(the woman with tinnitus), the consistency of the pa-
tient’s EAS request took precedence over her ability to
consider alternatives, which the physicians agreed was
impaired due to her low level of intelligence. This was
not helped by the fact that “often the wrong treatments
had been instigated” and “practitioners had not encour-
aged her to try and persevere with these treatment(s) a
bit longer”. If stringent capacity assessment criteria were
to be applied in this case, it may well be that the pa-
tient’s inability to appreciate the significance of the infor-
mation in relation to her own situation, and to weigh up
treatment options, would render her incapable to make
an EAS decision, however persistent her EAS request. In
case 2013–22, the patient interpreted light flashes re-
lated to her eye disease as “people shining lights into her
house” and was disturbed by this; she “could not be con-
vinced” by the physician’s efforts to help her understand
the cause of her symptoms. Under stringent capacity
testing, such inability to understand the nature of her
condition could have led to the conclusion that the pa-
tient lacked decisional capacity. As the Dutch govern-
ment guidance states:
“In assessing whether the patient understands the
nature of his health condition, one aspect that must
be checked is whether he can see the relevant causal
links, or conversely, whether he ascribes his health
condition to a cause other than the ‘objectively’
determined one. A lack of insight into his condition is
a factor that can be important in assessing decisional
capacity.” [22] (p.12, translated by ITW)
It is evident from the RTE verdicts that it does not re-
quire patients to meet all four Appelbaum criteria. The
difficulties many people with intellectual disabilities have
in rationally manipulating information with regard to
their situation, the consequences of their decision and
the possible alternatives make them particularly vulner-
able when the bar for capacity assessment is not set
high. Of all four Appelbaum criteria, appreciation ability
is undoubtedly the most difficult to understand and
measure. This conclusion was also reached in a system-
atic review of decision-making capacity of patients with
depression, which found that appreciation of information
was the ability that was most impaired, but difficult to
measure within standard capacity tests [29].
Making a “voluntary and well-considered request” is
closely related to the concept of autonomy. Autonomy
in decision-making is complex for people with intellec-
tual disabilities and not easily achieved. Whether a per-
son is able to have a high level of self-determination is
not necessarily dependent on their intellectual ability. A
study of 301 adults with intellectual disabilities found
that experience and opportunities to make everyday choices
contributed significantly to greater self-determination and
autonomy; intellectual capacity, on the other hand, was not
a significant factor [31]. People with intellectual disabilities
generally have less experience of and control over major de-
cisions that affect their lives than those without intellectual
disabilities [32], and therefore may lack the necessary skills
in making life-changing decisions.
A recognition that people with cognitive conditions
may need not only highly skilled capacity assessments
but also robust support in the decision-making process
is not clearly addressed within the Dutch case summaries.
The presence of a ‘mentor’ at patient-physician meetings
was mentioned in two case summaries, but family was not-
ably absent. It may be that family and carers were involved
but that this was not reported in the case summaries; or
that the reporting physicians wanted to be sure that the
patient was not under undue influence of family or carers
(‘voluntary request’). It seems, however, that for vulnerable
patient groups, the perspectives of those in the person’s so-
cial circle can be invaluable. In the UK, inquiries into health
and social care provision for people with an intellectual dis-
ability have found consistently that including and listening
to their family and carers is important in ensuring patient
safety [33, 34]. The guidelines for testing impairment under
the Oregon Act [35] include the recommendation to con-
sult, where possible and with the patient’s consent, the pa-
tient’s significant others about their views on the patient’s
competence and the patient’s decision. Similarly, the Dutch
government guidance on capacity assessments includes the
statement that “the decision about capacity is often difficult
and should be discussed with the various professionals and
carers involved… this is particularly important for serious
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decisions” [22]. We found no evidence in the case reports
that physicians included the perspectives of family and
carers who knew the patient well.
(b)Unbearable suffering without prospect of
improvement
Under the Dutch EAS system, it is up to the physician
to decide whether the patient’s suffering is indeed un-
bearable; this is then verified by the independent con-
sultant. In the 2016 annual report, it is explained that
the review committees
“do not re-examine the same issues as the physician
who made the original decision. The RTE cannot do
this, as the patient is no longer alive.” [36] (p.24)
The RTE therefore scrutinises whether or not the phys-
ician could have reasonably come to a conclusion about the
degree of suffering, but does not decree whether the physi-
cian’s verdict is correct. This places the responsibility for
assessing suffering solely on the shoulders of physicians. It
is important to remember the gravity of the physicians’ de-
cision: in agreeing that suffering is unbearable and without
prospect of improvement, they ultimately agree that it is
better for the patient to be dead than to live.
There are obvious difficulties with implementing this
criterion. Suffering is a deeply subjective experience, and
it could be argued that no person can ever truly under-
stand the experience of someone else’s suffering, nor as-
sess whether such suffering is severe enough to make the
patient’s life not worth living [37]. Cormack and Fléchais
[38] point out that suffering needs to be interpreted in
the context of the patient’s personality structure, coping
mechanisms and psychosocial environment, and argue
that the Dutch requirement of suffering being ‘palpable’
to doctors raises concerns about counter-transference.
The word ‘palpable’ is a perhaps inadequate translation
from the Dutch ‘invoelbaar’, which implies that the phys-
ician needs to ‘feel’ or ‘imagine’ their patient’s suffering,
from the patient’s perspective. The difficulties with this
requirement are clear from those case reports where physi-
cians struggled to understand the patient’s perspective. Case
2016–48 (a woman with autism spectrum disorder) is a
striking example. The physician visited the patient several
times but was unable to understand the patient’s view of
her own suffering. He trusted a psychiatrist who told him
that the experience of suffering is different for people with
autism spectrum disorder. A physician’s ability to empathise
and ‘feel’ his patient’s suffering is a guideline specified in
the RTE Code of Practice [6], but it seems that because of
the patient’s specific disabilities, it was suggested that this
was not possible. Physicians’ acceptance that the suffering
of patients with particular conditions may not be obvious
to them could have the worrying implication that for
people with some conditions or disabilities, a different
(lower) standard for judging the severity of the suffer-
ing is accepted.
It has been made legally clear that a somatic or psychi-
atric medical condition must be the cause of the suffering
that leads to the EAS request, but there is a lack of clarity
around the question whether lifelong disability would qual-
ify as a reason for EAS. If the answer is ‘yes’, the implica-
tions for people with disabilities could be very serious. In
this context, it is of concern that for several of the patients’,
suffering was described in terms of their lifelong condition,
rather than their psychiatric illness (see, for example, cases
2013–21, 2013–22 and 2014–77). Autism spectrum disor-
ders and intellectual disability, with concomitant difficulties
with social communication and relationships, could make it
more difficult for patients to cope with the changes that
come with ill health and ageing, or to weigh information, or
to understand and accept possible alternatives. In the
case summaries, the term ‘suffering’ was used to de-
scribe the normal variations in behaviour and percep-
tions seen in people with autism spectrum disorders
which are an inherent part of the person. There were
no explanations of how a lifelong condition such as
autism spectrum disorder could be seen as “no longer”
curable, nor how it might be treated palliatively. State-
ments about the lack of prospect of improvement, such
as “intractable symptoms”, “refractory to treatment” and
“palliative treatment”, are meaningless in the context of
lifelong disability. This raises the prospect of diagnostic
overshadowing, where there is a negative bias impacting
on a clinician’s judgement regarding co-occurring condi-
tions in people with an intellectual disability or mental
health condition, and symptoms due to a specific condi-
tion are attributed to another [39].
It seems clear from the Dutch case summaries that the
patients were indeed suffering, and that they viewed
their suffering as unbearable. When suffering is the re-
sult of a progressive medical condition, its assessment
may be relatively straightforward. It is not surprising,
perhaps, that case 2016–03 (a patient with an advanced
tumour) is highlighted in the RTE annual report as an
example of someone with intellectual disabilities who
could choose EAS. Difficulties arise when the suffering,
or the fact that the suffering cannot be relieved, is re-
lated to the nature of autism spectrum disorder or intel-
lectual disability itself – as was the case for those who
were highly dependent, had difficulties with social func-
tioning, difficulties in coping with social circumstances,
or a tendency not to cooperate with treatments.
Assessing the nature of suffering is a key question and
has significance for disabled people, whether intellectual
or otherwise. As we have seen, EAS requests are often
based not on pain but on loss of dignity and autonomy.
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An unintended consequence of this rationale for EAS is
to imply that lives lived with disability must be undigni-
fied, and that disabled people must experience suffering,
despite assertions to the contrary by people living with
long term disability [40]. Numerous reports in recent
years have suggested that the lives of people with an
intellectual disability are valued less across society, and
that their short life expectancy results from inappropri-
ate value-laden decision-making by healthcare profes-
sionals [30, 41, 42].
(c)Informing the patient about his/her situation
and prospects
All patients need adequate information, but informing
patients with intellectual disabilities may require consid-
erable effort. It is crucial that the information is given in
a format that the patient can understand, if patients with
intellectual disabilities are to be properly supported to
make decisions of such a serious nature. Even people
with mild intellectual disabilities, who are recognised as
being capable of making independent and autonomous
decisions in some circumstances, may require informa-
tion presented clearly in pictures or other reasonable ad-
justments in order to be able to fully understand and
appreciate their situation. The lack of detail about how
patients were informed about their situation and pros-
pects makes it very difficult to understand how physi-
cians have done this, or what expert assistance they
need in the future.
(d)No reasonable alternative
The key challenge in relation to this due care criterion
is that the conclusion must be reached by the physician
together with the patient. This implies a level of partner-
ship working of which many people with intellectual dis-
abilities have little experience during their lifetime, making
this a difficult criterion to implement. Partnership working
and ‘shared decision-making’ are important in achieving
patient autonomy and patient-centred care. It requires an
excellent relationship between the physician and the pa-
tient. For people with intellectual disabilities and/or autism
spectrum disorder, especially those who also have long-
standing psychiatric problems, building such relationships
is likely to require time, and therefore, applying the usual
standards and timeframes for EAS trajectories may put
vulnerable patient groups at a disadvantage, or even at risk.
In several cases, especially those where the patient’s own
physician did not want to enter the EAS trajectory, the rela-
tionship between the patient and the physician carrying out
the euthanasia was fairly recent. Furthermore, several case
reports seem to imply that there were frictions between
the physicians and patients, especially around the question
whether further treatments were possible and reasonable.
The patient who called her psychiatrist “an oaf who
doesn’t understand a thing” is an example of this (case
2013–22). It is difficult to see how an assessment of the
patient’s prospects can be made, together with the patient,
in such complex circumstances.
(e)Consulting at least one other independent
physician
As we have discussed above, assessing capacity and sup-
porting autonomy outside an ongoing relationship with
the patient can be problematic for people with intellectual
disabilities, and these problems will be magnified if there
are also mental health issues. It appears, therefore, that
the requirement of a second opinion from an independent
consultant (responsible for assessing whether the due care
criteria had been met) may not be appropriate for people
with cognitive conditions. It will often be too difficult to
gain sufficient understanding of the patient and come to a
fully informed view in just one meeting, no matter how
carefully the consultant has studied all the case notes. It
could be argued that it is difficult to assess any patient’s
request in one meeting, whether they have a disability or
not, but it seems that people who have difficulty with
communicating and relating to others are at a particular
disadvantage.
Limitations
The most obvious limitation is that the case summaries
are unlikely to tell the whole story. They are rather brief,
with a frustrating amount of ‘standard text’ that some-
times fails to convey the individual nature of each situ-
ation. It may well be, for example, that family and carers
were involved or that capacity assessments were far more
extensive than was reported, but we could only base our
assessment on what was written in the case summaries. It
was striking that much illuminating detail was included in
those case summaries where physicians had been asked by
the RTE to give further explanations. It would be highly
valuable to conduct in-depth interview-based research
with physicians, families and carers who have been in-
volved with EAS for patients with autism spectrum dis-
order or intellectual disabilities; this would provide crucial
further insight into the patients’ character, life story, social
circumstances, important relationships, and crucially, the
assessment of the due care criteria. It is possible that the
concerns we have highlighted could be dismissed if the full
facts of the cases were known. However, as Doernberg et
al. [12] point out, since these summaries are meant to act
as ‘case law’, not including extensive capacity discussions
leads to the conclusion that the RTEs do not seem to ex-
pect high levels of scrutiny from physicians, nor a high
threshold for capacity.
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It was not the aim of this paper to establish how preva-
lent EAS is for people with autism spectrum disorder or in-
tellectual disabilities, and we are unable to conclude how
often such cases arise. We found nine relevant case sum-
maries out of 416 (2.2%), which is roughly in line with the
prevalence of intellectual disabilities among the population.
However, those 416 published summaries represent only
1.6% of the total number of EAS cases over the 5 year
period. It may be that the other 98.4% are more straightfor-
ward and less likely to involve such complex situations; on
the other hand, it is also possible that intellectual disability
is under-reported. In several of the case reports, the pres-
ence of “mild intellectual disability” was only mentioned in
passing, in a description of the patient’s medical history. It
is also possible that many physicians do exercise extreme
caution when a patient with an intellectual disability or aut-
ism spectrum disorder requests EAS, as indicated by the
fact that two thirds of the reviewed cases had their initial
EAS request refused. A study of outcomes of the 645 EAS
requests to the End of Life Clinic during its first year (2012)
found that about half such requests were refused. Factors
associated with a request being rejected included being
single, a psychological condition, and having loneliness or
loss of mental capacity [43]. The lack of information on
prevalence does not detract from the aim of this paper,
however, which was to examine how the EAS due care
criteria are (and can be) applied in these cases.
Conclusion
This paper tried to answer the question whether there
are any particular difficulties in applying the Dutch due
care criteria for EAS to patients with intellectual disabilities
and/or autism spectrum disorders. Following the examin-
ation of the Dutch case reports, we conclude that the safe-
guards, in the form of legal due care criteria, are not easily
applied to people with intellectual disabilities or autism
spectrum disorder, and that the usual standards could
in fact have the unintended effect of leaving vulnerable
patients at risk. For disabled citizens to have equal rights
(including the right to EAS in jurisdictions where this is a
legal option), there must be ‘reasonable adjustments’ in
place to ensure that the standard procedures do not leave
them at a disadvantage.
Much attention has been focused on the importance
of capacity assessments. The RTE Code of Practice [6]
and 2016 Annual Report [9] have stipulated that EAS for
people with intellectual disabilities is possible, provided
that specific attention is paid to the assessment of decision
making capacity. From the literature and our examination
of nine case reports published on the RTE website, we con-
clude that assessment of capacity can be extremely difficult
people with intellectual disabilities, however mild. It re-
quires a high level of expertise and an intimate knowledge
of the patient. There are specialist intellectual disability
physicians in the Netherlands, but there was evidence of
involvement of such a specialist in only one of the cases
(2016–03). We would suggest that a specialist intellectual
disability physician should be involved in all cases where
someone with an intellectual disability requests EAS, and
that all physicians involved in capacity assessments of
patients with intellectual disabilities or autism spectrum
disorder (including those offering a second opinion) must
have enhanced training in this area. The currently used
Appelbaum criteria for capacity assessments are not with-
out their critics. The way in which these criteria are opera-
tionalised for people requesting EAS, and the question
whether these criteria are in fact the most adequate or suf-
ficient, needs urgent further investigation. To what extent
the criterion of appreciating information is able to cover
the complexities, emotions and values associated with
making an EAS decision needs further clarification and
debate. This is particularly pertinent for people with intel-
lectual disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorders, but
may also be highly relevant to patients with mental health
problems or dementia.
The challenges in applying the EAS due care criteria
to people with intellectual disabilities or autism spectrum
disorder go well beyond capacity assessments, however.
We are particularly concerned about the implications of
the difficulties in assessing suffering in people with intellec-
tual disabilities or autism spectrum disorder. Dependency,
functional limitations and difficulties with integration in
society are often part of conditions which these groups of
people live with all their lives. The Dutch cases raise the
possibility that the bar for assessment of intractable suffer-
ing is set lower for people with an intellectual disability or
autism spectrum disorder than for the general population,
by considering their long term disability as a medical rather
than a social condition. We found no evidence of safe-
guards against the influence of the physicians’ own subject-
ive value judgements when considering EAS decision, nor
of processes designed to guard against transference of the
physicians’ own values and prejudices. We suggest that it is
important for physicians to be aware of, and articulate, their
criteria for judging the patient’s suffering; and for the
people in the patient’s circle of family and carers to be in-
cluded in the process, and their opinions to be taken into
consideration. We also suggest that an important ‘reason-
able adjustment’ for patients with intellectual disabilities
and/or autism spectrum disorder is an extension of the
usual timeframes for EAS trajectories. Such an extended
timeframe can help all physicians involved (including those
required to give an independent opinion) to take the time
to build a relationship of trust with the patient.
We align ourselves to the aim of the EAPC to promote
the availability of the best possible palliative care for vul-
nerable people, including people with intellectual disabil-
ities, in accordance with current professional opinion
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(including those of physicians, ethicists and lawyers) in
each country. It has been recognised that people with in-
tellectual disabilities need special attention to ensure
equitable palliative care, as they have specific vulnerabil-
ities that make it much more difficult to assess, interpret
and meet their needs [44].
Within the Dutch system, we urge particular caution
in cases of EAS requests from people with intellectual
disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorder, with the
onus on both physicians and the RTE to demonstrate
much more clearly how all due care criteria were met.
We suggest that there should be ‘reasonable adjustments’
to act as additional safeguards for vulnerable and disabled
patients. Helping someone to die is such a serious and ir-
reversible decision that if there is any doubt or uncer-
tainty, even if only from one physician, we suggest that
physicians should err on the side of refusal; and that if the
EAS is subsequently carried out, the RTE process should
include a review of the opinion of physicians who did not
think the due care criteria were met. Looking at the
international implications, we suggest that any plans to
introduce or adapt EAS legislation should include a
very careful assessment of whether such legislation in-
cludes sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable pa-
tient groups.
Widening the implications even further, we speculate
that many of the challenges highlighted in this paper
could also be relevant to patients in the general popula-
tion, and that they are simply more pronounced or ex-
treme for vulnerable patient groups. It is quite possible
that people with intellectual disabilities are like the
canary in the coal mine, among the first to come up
against issues that turn out to be issues for everyone. It
may well be that the ability to use rationality and logic
when weighing up the EAS option, and thus decision-
making capacity in accordance with standard capacity
tests, is impaired in most people affected by the emo-
tional turmoil of terminal illness or suffering caused by
chronic conditions. Perhaps the difficulties of physi-
cians to appreciate suffering of patients with intellec-
tual disabilities or autism spectrum disorders is in fact
indicative of the difficulties in putting themselves into
anyone’s shoes. We have argued that people with intel-
lectual disabilities who request EAS need particular at-
tention and stringent assessments in order to protect
them from harm. The question whether the Dutch due
care criteria act as sufficient and effective safeguards
for any patient, or whether assessments should perhaps
be more stringent for all patients, would need further
investigation and is beyond the scope of this paper. If
more stringency is needed for all patients, then ‘getting
it right’ for people with intellectual disabilities will
benefit everyone. We welcome further and ongoing de-
bate on the issues raised.
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